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ABSTRACT. The value of civility is grounded upon acceptance of the legitimacy of moral disagreement 
and the need for mutual respect and cooperation in the face of such disagreement. The distinction 
between rights and goods plays a fundamental role in the form of civility espoused by liberal society. 
Current models of constitutional rights and proportionality, in a variety of ways, erode that distinction 
and thereby place the liberal model of civility in jeopardy.  
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After Eden 
A tradition of political thought that stretches back to Plato and Aristotle views the institutions of the 
political community as serving to foster excellent lives for human beings. Law plays an important part 
in this picture: it helps to inculcate habits of virtue; it helps to protect the virtuous from the predations 
of the wicked; and it helps to sustain other institutions (such as property, the market and the family) 
which themselves foster excellence and encourage virtuous habits. But law does none of these things 
alone. For this tradition, law is only one part of a more complex fabric of practices and institutions 
with its centre in a single set of values. Those values permeate the whole and provide the unity that 
makes political association possible. 
From the early modern period, and partly in response to the Wars of Religion, a different way of 
thinking about politics starts to predominate. For a variety of reasons, some not fundamentally 
incompatible with the first tradition, this approach tries provisionally to set on one side ultimate 
questions about the nature of human perfection and to provide a framework of entitlements within 
which individuals can choose and pursue their own conceptions of a good life. Within this way of 
thinking law becomes utterly central, since it is law that has the task of establishing the relevant 
entitlements. Reflecting the centrality of law, juridical concepts (such as justice and rights) come to 
dominate the public discourse. An older language, of virtue and the common good, comes to be 
unduly neglected. 
Although many think of these two traditions of thought as radically opposed, wiser souls view them 
as mutually enriching strands of thought. Both must play a part in any sound form of liberal democratic 
politics. Ideas of justice and rights are not self-sustaining: they become productive of illusions when 
they are isolated from a broader concern with human flourishing. At the same time, the distinct 
features of the juridical realm must be sustained if freedom is to be preserved. Rights must not be 
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made conditional upon their virtuous exercise, nor dissolved into a goal-oriented focus upon the 
attainment of desirable states of affairs. In particular, the rule-based character of law must be 
respected. A polity that in this way respects the integrity of law thereby establishes a form of civic 
friendship for a world where justice is always contested.  
Michael Walzer has described liberalism as an `art of separation’.2 It separates private life from public 
life; church from state; the family from the economy; the state from civil society; adjudication from 
legislation; and so forth. Each of these separable spheres derives its character from the distinct values 
towards which it is oriented. The pre-liberal view assumed a single right ordering of conduct directly 
informing every aspect of social and political life. Merchant, prince and peasant were to act upon a 
shared idea of Christian virtue, grounded in the teachings of the Church. The social order was 
conceived of `as a highly articulated organism of members contributing in their different degrees to a 
spiritual purpose.’3 But liberals came to understand that, while any tolerable political community must 
rest upon shared values, those public values are to some extent separable from many of the concerns 
which centrally inform the private lives of citizens. The need for virtue cannot be confined to the 
private realm, for there are distinct public virtues which ground mutually respectful interaction, along 
with political and mercantile probity. Such public virtues facilitate the peaceful pursuit of diverse 
private goals. But, being expressive of full mutual recognition and civic friendship, they also, in 
themselves, constitute a centrally important aspect of a flourishing life.  
The various separations cherished by the liberal are not given by abstract reason but result from a 
mixture of accident and artifice. They require an `artificial reason’ of the kind that Sir Edward Coke 
ascribed to the law. Indeed, the taught traditions of the law have often played a large part in 
maintaining the stability of the relevant distinctions. But, for this very reason (and given the centrality 
of law to modern liberal society), an erosion of such distinctions within the law itself could have 
particularly far-reaching consequences. 
To describe something as `artificial’ was once to say that the thing in question is a potentially 
admirable work of human ingenuity, manifesting the relationship between human freedom and the 
divine plan, and adding thereby to the glory of God’s creation. It in this light that we must understand 
Coke’s idea of the law’s `artificial reason’.4 For natural reason is, on its own, insufficient to resolve our 
problems. Reason reveals to us the need for mutually respectful cooperation, and for the conduct of 
our lives in friendship with others. But it does not offer us a blueprint for our lives together. We 
disagree about justice; and, on any sound understanding, the prescriptions of justice are plural and 
potentially competing. In consequence of this, we must devise our own solutions, even though our 
solutions will still be constrained by circumstance and answerable to very general requirements of 
reason.  
Today, however, to say that something is `artificial’ is to say that it is fake, or lacking in real value.5 We 
contrast `artifice’ with such things as authenticity and sincerity. Reflecting that outlook, many people 
today think that the law should directly reproduce the latitude and accessibility of popular discourse: 
a modern analogue of the `natural reason’ favoured by King James in his famous debate with Coke. 
They would see only exclusivity and elitism in an `artificial reason’ that must be `gotten by long study’.  
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And, to those who take that view, the introduction of `human rights’ to the law seems beneficially to 
disrupt the hard carapace of traditional legal thought, creating a conduit through which fundamental 
values, expressed in a currently familiar idiom, can enter the courtroom in a relatively unmediated 
form. Because the firm rules and clear watersheds, which are aspired to by the taught tradition of law, 
often fail accurately to trace the fluid contours of our ordinary concerns, those rules come to be 
regarded as regrettable obstacles (`artificial’ in the pejorative sense) to the pursuit of what truly 
matters. A form of legal thought which balances values one against another comes to seem both more 
transparent and more focused upon the important issues. The boundary between juridical reason and 
social policy becomes blurred.6 Coke’s talk of `artificial reason’ begins to seem no more than a 
smokescreen wrapped around sectional interest. 
The separations of liberal thought and practice have long been subjected to hostile scrutiny. Typically, 
in this genre, the various dichotomies are revealed to be products of historical contingency and are 
then attacked as having damaging and distortive consequences. Thus market freedoms can be 
portrayed as serving only to obscure the realities of domination and exploitation; the family can be 
painted, in sombre tones, as a realm of domestic tyranny and a source of distributive injustice; the 
private associations of civil society (such as churches and independent educational institutions) can 
be viewed as pernicious barriers to moral uniformity; the principled consistency of legal doctrine can 
be viewed as merely an illusory heaven of equal rights disguising material inequality. The critiques 
derive much of their power from the implied contrast with an imagined community, free from liberal 
separations, where the embeddedness of institutions within a uniform ethical fabric erases the harsh 
dichotomies of modernity. The critics tacitly lament the passing of a world of wholeness that 
supposedly preceded the division and fragmentation of the present; or they bemoan the 
unattainability of some such state, given our current situation on Dover Beach.  
Dreams of all-encompassing unity are not restricted to the critics of liberalism. For, in lending great 
prominence to the idea of rights, and in appearing to suggest that the realm of rights can be entirely 
self-sustaining, the public discourse of liberalism can itself become a source of such illusions. We 
traverse a landscape where mirages are frequent. Evanescent glimpses and faint suggestions are taken 
for evident indicators. Can we not find our way to the well-watered land of perfect justice and moral 
unanimity? Does the virtually universal endorsement of the idea of human rights not point to that 
land as just over the horizon?7 Is the path not already clear and open to us, provided that we are not 
discouraged by the voices of scepticism?  
In this way, constitutional arrangements that were adopted, after the Second World War, to prevent 
a recurrence of totalitarian horror, come to be viewed as signposts to a future transformed, not simply 
by the absence of abhorrent evil, but by the positive realisation of perfect justice. To construe such 
constitutional provisions as merely extreme backstop defences against the worst atrocities is, from 
this perspective, to neglect their potential for effecting an all-encompassing transformation.  
Reflective liberals of conservative disposition are unlikely to be seduced. They see abstract talk of 
justice and rights as failing to provide us with sufficiently determinate guidance. A high degree of 
convergence in the identification of truly gross injustice does not guarantee similar convergence in 
our opinions concerning perfect justice. Universal agreement upon general formulae (whether framed 
in terms of human rights, or freedom, or equality) is likely to fracture and disintegrate when the 
formulae must be unpacked and applied. Standards of justice are plural and permanently open to 
dispute. Public acceptance of that fact grounds the core political value of civility. Those who deny this, 
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and believe themselves to be in possession of the whole and incontestable truth concerning justice, 
seem to misunderstand the human condition quite fundamentally. The pursuit of perfect justice 
seems more likely to destroy civility than to foster any values that might transcend it.  
An elegiac strand of thought is fundamental to the cultural outlook of liberal conservatives: they find 
it natural to consider the most shimmering ideals to be illusory or irretrievably lost to us. Theirs is a 
politics of imperfection, grounded in a deep appreciation of the ease with which dreams can become 
nightmares. Purely celebratory or aspirational versions of liberalism (from which the elegiac motif and 
its associated scepticism are absent) become prominent from time to time. Mistakenly construing the 
dominant juridical discourse as embodying a self-sufficient vision of human community, rather than 
as one aspect of a complex web of dependencies and distinctions, these approaches quickly 
degenerate into vulgar sloganizing. They postulate all-encompassing political goals which possess a 
wide appeal only to the extent that their content remains unspecified (here the language of freedom, 
equality and human rights is especially popular). The supposedly happy conditions, which are vaguely 
envisaged by such language, are to be secured by the technical management of the state. This requires 
ever-increasing levels of intervention in the various aspects of social life which make up the liberal 
polity, thereby eroding the key separations (including the separation between state and civil society) 
upon which liberalism depends.  
Technocratic management of this sort in turn requires an appearance of commensurability to be 
imposed upon the diverse forms of value composing our moral and juridical life. For, without such a 
semblance of commensurability (if the relevant values are not to lose their distinct identities, a 
semblance is all it can be), technocratic decisions are revealed as groundless exercises of power.8 This 
misleading veneer of commensurability implies that demonstrably correct solutions are available to 
resolve core political issues, and that those who oppose such solutions are the enemies of justice: an 
erosion of civility is the inevitable result. The pretence of commensurability also obscures the diversity 
of forms that moral values typically exhibit and that a fully human life will encompass. For example, 
an adequately rich moral life will incorporate values that must be honoured or respected along with, 
but by contrast with, those that must be promoted or advanced; some values provide goals, while 
others constitute constraints upon the pursuit of goals. Within the outlook of technocracy, on the 
other hand, all values are to be `optimised’.9  
The wise liberal, sadly acknowledging that we are by nature fallen creatures who cannot return to 
Eden, finds a sense of loss to be entirely appropriate. This sadness must not divert us from the task of 
making the best of things, nor should it lead us to neglect or underrate such valuable practices as we 
already possess. We should not imagine that diverse values can, without losing their character, be 
stirred into a common pot. The imposition of a technocratic framework upon our values is not the 
replacement of unstructured intuition by articulate reason. Nor is it a successful convergence upon a 
common agenda that will lead to a promised land. Rather, it is a failure to understand the nature of 
our own cultural and political heritage. When reflectively understood, that inheritance (marked 
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though it may be by the fact of human imperfection and the unavoidable reality of moral 
disagreement) embodies a unity that transcends mere uniformity.  
As Milton makes clear in the closing lines of Paradise Lost, when we look back on Eden we are right to 
drop `some natural tears’. But it is also right that we should `wipe them soon’. For it is the loss of Eden 
that makes us fully human, and our humanity is not to be regretted. Bearing the burden of our 
humanity, but also cherishing that humanity, we must `hand in hand, with wandering steps and slow’ 
make our way through the world that lies before us. No single path is pre-ordained for us by reason, 
and no heavenly destination is secure. Our journey is not a march to some distant horizon where all 
that matters is the destination. It is a slow forging of bonds between the wanderers (bonds which are 
inseparable from memory, and attachment to the things that have been). The required posture of self-
reliance, realistic hope, mutual supportiveness, and fortitude in the face of adversity, confers on us 
our most ennobling aspect.  
To say that we must make our own way is not to say that our course is arbitrary. Nor is it to suggest 
that our course can be pursued only in a spirit of post-modernist ` irony’. The ways that we might follow 
are the product of some broad prescriptions of reason, but those prescriptions require us to establish 
the institutions of civility, and such institutions can take a variety of different forms. A concrete version 
of civility emerges through a mixture of practice, experience, local allegiance, and reflective dialogue. 
The separations upon which liberalism relies are indeed (as the critics have noticed) historical products 
rather than direct dispositions of reason. They are established as we go along, slowly woven into the 
texture of our lives, and found to be habitable before they become features of a philosophical 
understanding. Not everything of value needs to be an unmediated expression of natural reason: 
custom, shared attachment and habituation will always play a large part. The somewhat accidental 
inception of our practices will generally long precede our reflective understanding of their significance. 
But the attainment of that understanding does not convert our civil and political practices into mere 
applications of abstract principle. Indeed, they are to a large extent the groundwork of such principles, 
in detachment from which the principles themselves cannot be grasped or applied. We are the heirs 
of a complex history, and such spiritual depth as we possess is ours only in consequence of that history.  
 
Rights and goods 
One of the key distinctions for the liberal `art of separation’ is that between the realm of rights, on 
the one hand, and the realm of goods more generally, on the other. The separation is necessary if 
individuals are to enjoy a sphere within which their will can be decisive; without such a sphere, liberty 
cannot be a reality. Consequently, rights, once conferred by law or publicly acknowledged, must give 
to the individual a secure domain wherein the majority’s view of what is desirable no longer prevails. 
As John Rawls points out, we think of justice as requiring rights that are not subject to `the calculus of 
social interests’.10 For that to be possible, not all social interests or values can be treated as rights. 
There must be a difference between rights and those various things which are good and to be pursued 
by governments and individuals. 
The difference is manifested in the differing logics that rights and goods obey. Rights are to be carefully 
delineated, acknowledged and respected. They have bounds which should not be violated. Rights offer 
each of us a domain of options which enjoy a significant degree of independence from the will of 
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others.11 This is why the boundaries of a right must, so far as possible, be identifiable in advance of 
particular situations where the right must be invoked and relied upon.  
The boundaries of a right are important, even though they may seem on occasion to be artificial 
disruptions of the continuities of natural reason. Moral issues, taken in the round, are usually too 
complicated and multi-faceted to admit of reduction to simple watershed rules. To recognise rights is 
to ascribe decisive significance to what may seem only a narrow aspect of the moral situation. For this 
reason, those who emphasise the importance of rights can sometimes appear to be blind to the 
complexity of the moral issues that we confront. An insistence on rights as overriding can strike us as 
dogmatic. And those who dream of Eden may feel convinced that we can find a more sensible and 
moderate way of accommodating rights within our polity. Here is the seed of error. 
By contrast with rights, which should not be violated, goods are to be pursued but must consequently 
be weighed and balanced against each other. Within the discourse of goods all relevant considerations 
seem to be easily accommodated, making this approach appear to be considerably more flexible, and 
open to the complexity of human affairs, than is the discourse of rights. But this flexibility in 
acknowledging various aspects of the moral situation is then combined with an opaque strategy for 
relating those aspects one to another: we are simply told that they must be `balanced’. In seeking to 
understand this form of reasoning, it proves remarkably difficult to penetrate beyond the metaphors 
of `weight’ and `balancing’.  
Amongst other separations, liberalism requires respect for the differences between two distinct forms 
of discourse: one where, unavoidably, we weigh and balance goods, and another where we 
acknowledge and respect rights. The boundary between these domains, and the notion of an 
individual right itself, are not things directly given by reason, but something that an emergent 
liberalism distils from an older discourse of right ordering.12 At the same time the ideas in question 
are not arbitrary, but responsive to the needs of social creatures. Established and policed by the rule 
of law, rights are possible only as a result of the governance of rules (the rule of law being 
fundamentally the governance of rules). This is not to deny the possibility of moral rights apart from 
law. But our sense of the overriding importance of rights, and therefore of moral rights, is always 
dependent upon our familiarity with the idea of respect for rules as something apart from the 
weighing and balancing of goods. The most eloquent expression of what is involved in such respect is 
to be found in the traditions of law. Moral rights grow and have their being only under the aegis of 
the law. As Maitland pointed out, `nothing that we can do will ever deprive the word “rights” of its 
legal savour.’13 
The logic of rights is quite different from the logic of values more generally. In asserting that I have a 
right to act in a certain way, or a right to some performance on your part, I do both more and less than 
claim that the action in question would be good and valuable. I do less than this because we may have 
rights to perform actions that are without value and perhaps even highly undesirable. To some extent 
this is a consequence of the liberal’s emphasis upon the value of free choice: freedom to choose must 
often include freedom to choose badly. But it is also a consequence of the liberal’s commitment to 
governance by general rules rather than ad hoc decision-making. Governing rules need to be workably 
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clear and simple, and will therefore often fail to exclude from the scope of their protection activities 
that have little or no value. Practical requirements here reinforce liberal values.  
In claiming a right I also do more than claim that my action is valuable. For valuable things must be 
weighed against other valuable things with which they can clash and compete. The logic of rights is 
different. Rights possess peremptory force. They bring an end to weighing and balancing. The question 
is not one of how my interests are balanced against yours, but of whether I am within or without the 
scope of my rights. The boundary of a right is uniquely important. The special force of rights is precisely 
their resistance to balancing. As Bernard Williams puts it, `If people have a right to something, then 
someone does wrong who denies it to them.’ Rights do not, Williams observes, `signal goods and 
opportunities which ….should be provided if it is possible.’ 14 
This peremptory force is clearest of all in the case of legal rights. If I demonstrate to the judge that I 
have a legal right to plant tall trees along the perimeter of my land, depriving your land of light, we do 
not expect the judge to say “I accept that you have such a right and I will certainly take account of it 
when I decide whether you should be allowed to plant the trees.” Once the right is demonstrated, the 
question at issue is conclusively resolved. When rights relate to the right-holder’s own action, they 
are conclusive of the permissibility of that action.15 And when they relate to the action of another, 
they are conclusive of the duty to perform that action. Rights on this model are best framed, not as 
rights to states of affairs, but as rights to the performance of actions (including, when the right is so 
defined, actions that secure the existence of a certain state of affairs).  
The peremptory force of rights is grounded in the fact that law is primarily a body of rules. Rules, as 
Dworkin points out, apply in an ` all or nothing fashion’: if the rule is both valid and applicable it dictates 
the outcome in the case.16 A rule is not a reason for deciding the case one way which must then be 
balanced against other conflicting reasons. Collective judgments of good and bad are of course likely 
to underlie the community’s decision to confer this or that right. But, once conferred, rights can be 
exercised as the right-holder chooses.17 We expect the liberal polity to respect the integrity of rules, 
and we entrust a special responsibility for this to the guardians of artificial reason: lawyers, judges and 
legal scholars.  
The rule of law, understood in terms of Lon Fuller’s eight requirements,18 and the existence of rights, 
are in this way intimately interconnected. To the extent that the rule of law is observed, the law as a 
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whole becomes a complex system of rights and duties possessing peremptory force. And to the extent 
that I am governed in accordance with published, prospective rules, compliant with the eight 
requirements, I will enjoy a degree of freedom as independence from the power of others which can 
be enjoyed in no other way.19 For this reason, rules form the core of legal doctrine, and juristic 
craftsmanship embodies the aspiration of making the rules as clear, and as straightforwardly 
applicable, as possible. Although legal reason is always structured and informed by considerations of 
justice and the common good, proficient lawyers strive to make legal doctrine rule-like, so far as 
possible. They tend to regard vague formulations and balancing formulae as at best placeholders that 
must in due course be replaced by clear rules, when the accumulation of wisdom and experience 
makes the formulation of such rules possible. As Neil MacCormick put it, `Rival positions of principle, 
or rival views of the contextually appropriate balance or priority of principles, press towards settling 
rules that state a determinate position focused on determinate types of situation.’20  
Being the product of rules, rights that possess peremptory force are assumed to form an internally 
consistent scheme. Legal systems have intellectual practices that go some way towards maintaining 
this consistency. Thus we treat the later enactment as modifying the earlier enactment; the more 
specific rule as derogating from the more general rule. And, when rules appear to conflict in a way 
that is recalcitrant to these techniques, we strive to interpret each rule in a way that removes the 
conflict. By contrast with this, when rights are construed as `optimisation requirements’ (as Robert 
Alexy construes constitutional rights, in his enormously influential work on this subject21) conflicts 
between rights can be allowed to proliferate and must then be resolved by `balancing’ the relevant 
values in individual cases.  
The proposal that we think of rights as optimisation requirements to be balanced against each other, 
and against other considerations, may seem attractive. After all, when rights are given peremptory 
force, the precise location of the boundary of each right comes to be critically important (since the 
question to be addressed always concerns the scope of the right). But natural human concerns often 
fail to reflect the discontinuities established by rights, such discontinuities being the product of 
artifice. Our concerns tend to flow into one another, or to be marked by differences of degree rather 
than kind, making a focus upon clear boundaries seem misguided. Furthermore, however important 
rights may be, they are not absolute and are not the only things that we care about.22 We care about 
many different things and sometimes we are forced to choose. So why not acknowledge this situation 
more clearly, by thinking of rights as factors to be weighed in a balance rather than as possessing 
peremptory force? Why concern ourselves with the precise (and, therefore, somewhat artificial) 
boundary of each right, when we could treat each right as simply flagging up an area of concern that 
may have quite vague and indeterminate limits? Why not think of the political community as an 
undifferentiated field of competing values, governed by natural reason, rather than as an assemblage 
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of distinct practices each with its own internal logic? Do the artificial distinctions that we have 
inherited really matter? Can a deeper moral unity not be achieved if those distinctions are abandoned?  
In the face of such proposals, one who insists upon a particular usage (e.g. one who insists that rights 
must possess peremptory force) can appear to be merely dogmatic, as if they are simply invoking our 
ordinary usage and seeking to render that usage static and invulnerable to the flexibility of dialogue. 
The outright rejection of such dogmatism can seem sensible.  
An understanding of the nature of rights, however, should never be detached from the broader 
political and juridical philosophy which gives to such an understanding its point. My aim, therefore, is 
not dogmatically to assert and cling to a traditional meaning, as if meanings are set in stone. Rather, 
the aim is to deepen our grasp of distinctions that have, in the past, been respected and embodied in 
our practice, and to give some indication of why those distinctions matter. This is not an exercise in 
dogmatic lexicography, but a contribution to the liberal art of separation.  
 
Moral rights 
Of course, as I have already acknowledged, we may speak of moral rights as well as legal rights. 
Indeed, the centrality of law to the liberal vision of political community causes juridical notions, such 
as `justice’ and `rights’, to become dominant within public discourse. But here we find a dangerous 
dynamic within liberal society. For the emphasis upon the importance of rights within a liberal 
political community creates a popular culture wherein the language of rights can come to colonise 
every aspect of the moral discourse. To refuse to express a moral concern as a matter of `rights’ is 
now regarded as failing to take that moral concern seriously. Older moral concepts, such as `virtue’ 
and `the common good’, have an antiquated sound for modern ears. They are very little understood 
and may even have a vaguely troubling resonance for many. We find ourselves asking whether an 
emphasis on virtue might not be incompatible with the liberal’s celebration of personal freedom. Or 
we ask whether an emphasis on the common good might not endanger individual interests that 
compete with the common good. 
The delicate ecology of our inherited moral discourse is thus placed at risk by the steadily 
burgeoning discourse of rights. This is most certainly regrettable. For, apart from the other losses 
that the development entails, when all moral concerns are expressed as involving `rights’, we lose 
any sense of the precise way in which rights possess a special moral force. Rights come to be 
thought of as simply important interests that are to be balanced against other interests. The exact 
bounds of a right cease to be of real importance, since the right is fundamentally a factor to be 
weighed in a balance rather than a clearly defined domain of enforceable entitlement. Or, worse 
still, an assertion of `rights’ is thought of as simply a demand, indicative of strength of feeling but 
nothing more. A corrosive moral subjectivism here goes hand in hand with a public encouragement 
of intransigence. 
The neglect of, or misunderstanding of, such concepts as `virtue’ and `the common good’ is equally 
lamentable. For liberal democracy depends upon the virtue of its citizens: in particular the virtues of 
tolerance, mutual civility, and respect for the inherited practices that constitute the polity. The 
proper functioning of political institutions is seamlessly connected to the common courtesies that 
inform daily intercourse. A declining emphasis upon the virtue of citizens suggests a belief that 
politics is exclusively a struggle concerning the use of governmental power, rather than a matter 
which centres upon civil relations obtaining between citizens.23 But liberal democracy is unlikely to 
survive the emergence of a culture where citizens accept no need for personal virtue, no 
requirement of common civility, and expect all problems to be resolved by technocratic solutions.  
Similarly, the common good is not some sort of aggregate which can sensibly be contrasted with 
individual rights. It is not something that can be measured by economic indicators or by surveys of 
self-reported well-being. It is not the fruit of technocratic intervention. It is, at its core, an orderly 
structure of rights and practices grounded in the virtue of citizens. It must be oriented towards 
justice, but in a manner that acknowledges the contested nature of perfect justice and is therefore 
respectful of established laws. The common good is not the complete good for individuals, but nor is 
it merely an instrumentally important necessity. As an expression of civic friendship it is an essential 
constituent of individual flourishing: a constituent which can only be realised in common. It is the 
form of friendship obtaining between citizens who are independent yet mutually supportive. Our 
lives would be impoverished, and not simply impeded, without it. 
Misunderstanding these things, we are in danger of losing our path. To possess a distinct role within 
moral discourse, rights must possess a peremptory force analogous to that of legal rights. They must 
be treated as conclusive of the issues that they govern. A liberal society requires legal rights 
(primarily the rights conferred by ordinary laws) that are not optimisation requirements but 
peremptory constraints upon such requirements. Such an understanding of the nature and status of 
legal rights is threatened when our seemingly most prominent and important rights, namely 
constitutional rights, lack peremptory force. Rights must be insulated from the calculus of social 
interests: they must not become factors within that calculus. Such rights depend upon the art of 
separation. And respect for the relevant separation is an expression of civic friendship.  
The profligate invocation of moral `rights’ erodes significant distinctions and undermines mutual 
civility. Imbibing the general sense of rights as urgent and overriding, while ignoring its juridical 
substance, the insistence upon framing virtually every moral issue as one concerning `rights’ simply 
spawns an unwillingness to moderate demands or to concede the possibility of error. When every 
important interest comes to be spoken of as a right, the distinct logic of rights is obscured. In this 
way, the more celebratory and strident understandings of liberal values become the enemies of 
liberalism, destroying the political fabric that nurtured them. Haunted by a dream of moral 
wholeness, we too easily fall prey to an empty sloganizing which obliterates the established 
allegiances upon which civility depends. Setting our gaze upon remote horizons, we neglect the 
value of our familiar inheritance.24 We allow the liberal `art of separation’ to dissolve in a toxic 
monoculture of asserted but illusory rights.  
 
 
Constitutional rights 
After 1945 it was considered desirable to do something to prevent a recurrence of regimes resembling 
the Third Reich. Constitutional rights seemed to be part of the answer, and both the German Basic 
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24 See Simmonds, `The Bondwoman’s Son and the Beautiful Soul’ (2013) 58 American Journal of Jurisprudence 
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Law and the European Convention on Human Rights included a catalogue of such constitutional rights, 
drafted very much with the Third Reich in mind. The rights were not limited to the traditional civil and 
political liberties (the kind of rights that are thought to bolster the functioning of democracy). Nor 
were they framed, for the most part, by reference to permitted or required actions. Rather, they 
sought to identify certain fundamental human interests which were to be insulated from the most 
extreme hazards of legislative and governmental supremacy. This was a new turn in our politics and it 
posed some very new questions.  
The solution was found in defining rights very broadly but making the majority of such rights subject 
to limitation by reference to certain specified legitimate state objectives. The various possible bases 
for limiting rights are themselves framed broadly, so that they include practically all of the relevant 
considerations upon which any government could legitimately act. Given the historical context in 
which these documents emerged, one might well have expected that they would be construed as 
aiming to prevent only the most gross injustices; and, given their drafting, one might have assumed 
that this was to be achieved by restricting governments and legislatures to actions genuinely 
motivated by a concern for legitimate state objectives (thereby ruling out such things as the evident 
persecution of particular ethnic or religious groups).  
Instead of adopting such a reading, the courts concluded that the rights in question were to be applied 
only via a doctrine of `proportionality’. Under this doctrine, the encroachment upon the right must 
not only be strictly necessary to the advancement of a relevant governmental objective, but the latter 
advancement must also be sufficiently important to justify the particular encroachment involved. The 
approach immerses the courts in the task of weighing and balancing what are acknowledged to be 
entirely legitimate state objectives; and the core question to be addressed concerns, not the sincerity 
of the legislature’s ostensible purpose, but the soundness of the value judgements upon which their 
legislative decision rests. This model has been adopted in many jurisdictions around the world. The 
German Constitutional Court, the European Court of Human Rights, the Israeli Supreme Court, and 
the Canadian Supreme Court have all become highly influential exponents of what has been described 
as the `global model’ of constitutional rights.25   
That description is not intended to suggest that all of these regimes are fundamentally the same, but 
that they do have some important and distinctive features in common. The description may also seem 
appropriate for a further reason. The interpretation of rights in both the German Basic Law and the 
European Convention on Human Rights (and in constitutional documents from a number of other 
regimes) reflects the general way in which rights are framed by the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. They are, for the most part, framed and interpreted as protecting fundamental interests of the 
right-holder rather than by reference to specific actions (permissible actions of the right-holder or 
required actions of a correlative duty-bearer).26 And this common feature may suggest, as an ultimate 
guiding possibility, a monistic understanding of the relationship between international and domestic 
law, with the entire global structure centring upon human rights. 
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26 This is reflected in the idea that even those rights which might seem to impose only negative duties 
nevertheless require states to take positive steps to protect the relevant interests. Amartya Sen argues that, 
when rights are conceived of as defining or restricting permissible actions (rather than in terms of desirable 
outcomes), the rights conferred must nevertheless be selected by reference to their probable outcomes and 
are therefore parasitic upon the identification of desirable outcomes: Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice, 
(London: Allen Lane 2009) Chapter 14. Even if this is true (which I doubt) it does not alter the fact that rights 
defined by reference to permissible and impermissible actions (or choices) can be given peremptory force, 
while the ascription of such force to rights defined by reference to outcomes is likely to be very problematic. 
While it has its critics, the global model of constitutional rights also has many enthusiastic admirers. 
The reasons for the popularity of this model are not far to seek, even if we set on one side its 
suggestion of being a step on the way towards a rights-based global legal order. For it mirrors closely 
the popular culture of rights mentioned earlier, where rights come to be thought of as simply weighty 
interests that feature in a process of weighing and balancing. The popular discourse of rights, having 
developed in the shadow of the law, now threatens to become a parasite which fully colonises its host.  
 
An illusory distinction? 
My argument depends upon a contrast between the domain of rights and rules (on the one hand) and 
the domain of goods and balancing (on the other). But it might be suggested that the contrast is 
overdrawn. For, in the first place, some rules are framed in terms which require balancing: the most 
obvious example being rules that employ concepts such as `reasonableness’. However, given the task 
of interpreting and applying such rules, lawyers have often tended to develop, through precedent, 
subsidiary rules that unpack and concretise the requirements of `reasonableness’. This tendency 
(which some will consider undesirable) illustrates the way in which legal thought is normally guided 
by the orienting idea of law as a system of rules: lawyers have traditionally, and rightly, resisted the 
idea of official discretion unrestricted by rules and have seen it as part of their responsibility to develop 
and articulate the law in the form of rules. 
Robert Alexy envisages something similar happening, in the long term, in relation to the balancing of 
rights against governmental objectives, under his `Law of Competing Principles’. This law states, in 
Alexy’s formulation, that `The circumstances under which one principle takes precedence over 
another constitute the conditions of a rule which has the same legal consequences as the principle 
taking precedence.’27 The suggestion is that, through the steady accumulation of judicial decisions on 
the applicability of constitutional rights, a body of rules will slowly emerge. Those rules would in turn 
give rise to rights possessing genuine peremptory force. 
Even if Alexy was correct about this, we could scarcely rest easy with a deferral of secure rights into 
the indefinite, and probably quite remote, future. Nor are the current indications especially 
encouraging. Decisions on proportionality are often closely focused upon the specific facts of 
individual cases. Indeed, the proportionality doctrine does not seem to embody or encourage a sense 
of the lawyerly responsibility to develop and articulate workable rules for the guidance of future 
decisions. Judges cannot, of course, justify decisions by reference to non-universalisable features of 
the case (such as the date on which it was decided) since a requirement of universalizability is inherent 
in the very idea of justification. But they can justify their decisions by reference to complex 
assemblages of universalisable features, so that no workable rule which is likely to apply in future 
cases will emerge. And there are good reasons for expecting judges to adopt that course of action. 
For, if they allow binding subsidiary rules to develop, they will be abrogating for the future the very 
considerable political power that the balancing model gives them. Are we to ignore the possibility that 
judges may not wish to lay the shackles of law back on their own limbs, having once tasted the 
pleasures of political power without political responsibility?  
In the light of these considerations it would be foolish to dismiss the worries that many commentators 
have about the largely discretionary character of constitutional rights decisions under the doctrine of 
proportionality. The fact that legal scholars might hope, in due course, to distil some rules from a long 
course of discretionary judicial decisions is no substitute for the judges feeling a responsibility to 
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articulate such rules, and adhere to them, in the first place. Yet we find that enthusiastic admirers of 
the proportionality approach, far from urging judges to undertake such a responsibility, are inclined 
to be critical of the search for `very sharp, categorical distinctions’ and `rigid and unbending rules’.28 
It might be alleged that my picture of legal reasoning as rule-application is itself flawed. For rules are 
frequently modified in the course of application, and this is frequently done in the application of 
deeper legal principles. While rules apply in an ` all or nothing fashion’, theorists such as Dworkin speak 
of the law as involving `principles’ in addition to rules: principles have a dimension of weight and are 
to be weighed against each other. Furthermore, Alexy analogises constitutional rights to principles in 
other areas of law such as private law, viewing them both as `optimisation requirements’. So, from 
this point of view (it might be argued), the contrast between ordinary legal doctrinal thought and the 
balancing process established by the global model of rights is much less substantial than I am 
suggesting. 
But, in private law, principles are not best understood as serving interests or states of affairs that are 
describable independently of the principles. The principle that `no man shall profit from his own 
wrong’ does not aim at any situation other than the one that consists in people not profiting from 
their own wrongs. The principle that `contractual rights must be exercised in good faith’ governs the 
standards obtaining within the contractual relationship, but it does not aim to advance any 
independently identifiable state of affairs that is likely to flow from that principle-defined relationship. 
The principle volenti non fit injuria aims to specify what will and will not count as a legal injury, but 
does not aim thereby to advance some situation that could be defined in terms not involving the ideas 
of `injury’ and `consent’. We may loosely speak of the judge in the private law context as `balancing’ 
such principles one against another. But a more enlightening picture would be one of the judge or 
jurist seeking to frame rules that are appropriately respectful of the relevant principles. Even when 
the rules seek to advance certain goals in an instrumental fashion, the content of the rules will often 
be shaped by principles (perhaps by a plurality of partially competing principles) which are to be 
honoured and respected rather than advanced. The language of ` optimisation’ obscures this important 
difference.29 Here we see the imposition of a technocratic language upon juridical practices informed 
by more traditional moral conceptions. 
It should be added that principles in private law are themselves extrapolated and generalised from 
the existing legal rules. They serve to give greater determinacy to the legal rules by ensuring that the 
interpretation and application of individual rules is informed and controlled by the system of laws as 
a whole. The articulation of principles proceeds on the basis of an assumption that, to enjoy legitimacy, 
the legal rules must be aimed at implementing some coherent conception of justice and the common 
good. Constitutional rights, by contrast, need have no organic connection with the existing legal 
rules.30 They are introduced by enactment and their point is not to stabilise the interpretation of rules 
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Court (Beatty’s example of a rule-based approach) has not been very successful in articulating and adhering to 
such rules. 
29 See above n.9. 
30 The likelihood of any such organic connection is considerably reduced by the fact that the bulk of ordinary 
legal rights are rights to specific actions: liberties to perform actions, or claim-rights to the performance of 
such actions by determinate others. Constitutional rights, by contrast, tend to be rights to independently 
describable states of affairs, or to the performance of an indeterminate range of actions by indeterminate 
others.  I include some further remarks on this (and other related matters) in `Constitutional Rights and the 
Rule of Law’ (2016) Analisi e Diritto 251. 
but to measure those rules against an independent standard. Alexy’s analysis of constitutional rights 
and legal principles as both being `optimisation requirements’ is therefore inherently misleading. 
 
Justice and mutual civility 
Because constitutional rights are now required to be balanced against legitimate governmental 
objectives, their precise bounds are given less importance. The scope of the rights tends to spread 
until practically the whole law is entangled with issues of constitutional or human rights. This is 
especially true of those jurisdictions where the relevant catalogue of rights includes a general right 
to liberty. The tendency is greatly augmented by doctrines of `horizontal application’. The 
phenomenon may be referred to as `the radiating effect’ of rights.  
These very extensive rights now lack peremptory force: they settle nothing but are simply important 
considerations to be taken into account in a balancing process. We may well wonder whether 
anything is left here of the idea of `a right.’ The distinct logic of rights decomposes into the general 
balancing of values one against another.  
Thus the editors of a recent volume of essays on the subject tell us that rights have now been 
`overtaken’ by the idea of proportionality.31 One critical commentator has perceptively suggested 
that the entire catalogue of constitutional rights might be replaced by a simple provision to the 
effect that the law must observe the principle of proportionality.32 And one very enthusiastic 
advocate of the current law tells us that we need to `abandon the idea that rights hold a special 
normative force’ and should adjust our expectations concerning rights.33  
This is not simply a matter of constitutional rights falling short of the ideal we might have hoped for. 
If that were the case we might well say that they are not perfect, but they are better than nothing and 
we cannot see a way to improve them. The radiating effect of rights, and the doctrine of horizontal 
application, mean that practically the entire law comes to be subject to the proportionality test. So it 
is not just that we have got only part of what we might have wanted: constitutional rights but without 
the peremptory force of ordinary legal rights. We have in principle subjected all legal rights to a test 
of weighing and balancing against other values, thereby abandoning the distinctive logic of legal rights.  
And here the heart of the problem may become clearly visible. The idea of `proportionality’ is now 
standardly construed in a technocratic fashion that implies some form of commensurability (even if it 
is only the largely empty form of comparing degrees of seriousness of encroachment upon the 
relevant values). This is especially so when rights are thought of as `optimisation requirements’. But, 
if we set on one side the technocratic outlook that is suggested by such talk of proportionality, it might 
be said (as Aristotle might say) that proportionality is justice: a law which perfectly acknowledges all 
relevant interests and considerations, and exhibits respect for them in an appropriate way, is a 
perfectly just law.34 Is the core idea underlying the new law of constitutional rights simply the idea of 
justice? A constitutional doctrine that allows the judges to strike down laws (or require the 
amendment of laws) whenever they consider them to be unjust seems to be an experiment fraught 
with danger. For we disagree about justice. To say this is not at all to espouse a non-cognitivist position 
which says that there is no truth concerning justice. It is simply to say that arguments concerning 
                                                          
31 G. Huscroft, B. Miller, G.Webber (eds.), Proportionality and the Rule of Law, (Cambridge University Press 
2012) p.1. 
32 Gregoire Webber, The Negotiable Constitution, (Cambridge University Press 2009) p.4. 
33 Kai Moller, op. cit. n.26 above, p.73 and p.5n. 
34 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book V.  
justice are not algorithms; and, even if there is a truth, reasonable people will disagree about what 
the truth may be. This is not a contentious claim but a trite one. It is vital that we understand this, for 
it is the basis of the mutual civility upon which any liberal society must be built. 
If we are to have rights, we need a shared set of rules. We need, as Finnis puts it, a shared plan for the 
common good.35 A liberal society will favour a plan that establishes clear rules and avoids the 
conferment of extensive discretionary powers upon public officials (including judges). Hence the 
efforts of legislators, judges and jurists to articulate law in the form of a system of rules.36 And, failing 
a degree of unanimity which is highly unlikely in a modern liberal society, some of those shared rules 
will be regarded by many as less than perfectly just. Mutual civility, grounded in a wise acceptance of 
reasonable disagreement concerning justice, then requires compliance with rules even though we 
may consider them unjust. Our compliance with the law is the primary expression of our civility or 
civic friendship.37 
Mutual civility, and the requirement that the laws must be obeyed even when we consider them to 
be unjust, together rest upon the thought that my own views concerning justice may be mistaken. 
This thought in turn rests upon an idea of moral truth, for if there is no possibility of truth (if, for 
example, moral judgements are simple expressions of feeling without cognitive content) there can be 
no possibility of mistake. At the same time, the acknowledged possibility of error is an 
acknowledgment that moral arguments are not algorithms but depend upon an irreducible element 
of individual judgement that will vary from one person to another. By contrast with this, an 
entrenchment of proportionality doctrine at the heart of our law seems to imply a more technocratic 
view within which the systematic application of a prescribed analysis yields conclusions that do not 
admit of reasonable dispute. The falsehood thereby placed at the heart of our legal and political 
culture means that we build upon insecure foundations, permanently open to excoriating critique. 
One thing that mutual civility does not require is compliance with enacted rules that are themselves 
a clear breach of mutual civility: rules which are so grossly unjust that no reasonable person could 
possibly consider them to be just; rules that could not plausibly be claimed to be good faith, albeit 
misguided, attempts to articulate the requirements of justice. This is perhaps the idea behind Gustav 
Radbruch’s proposal that truly grossly unjust enactments should not be regarded as law at all.38 Like 
the drafters of the German Basic Law and the European Convention on Human Rights, he had in mind 
the experience of the Third Reich. Radbruch viewed his formula as a proposal for extreme situations 
going well beyond the disagreements of ordinary democratic politics. He particularly emphasised the 
need for compliance (by judges as well as citizens) with rules that are considered to be unjust, though 
not grossly so.  
Legal rights enjoy peremptory force in virtue of mutual civility. They should not be equated with the 
`absolute’ rights of the natural law tradition. Mutual civility finds expression in many ways, but one of 
them is the rule-based character of laws and the willingness of all citizens (judges included) to respect 
that character. An understanding of, and respect for, the rule-based character of law should be central 
to any decisions regarding the law-making effect of a statute, or a constitutional document: for how 
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38 For the best defence of Radbruch’s position, see Robert Alexy, The Argument from Injustice, (Oxford 
University Press 2003). 
can one determine the law-making effect of such a document without considering the essential nature 
of law?39  
One of Radbruch’s contemporary defenders is Robert Alexy, who is also the author of by far the most 
influential monograph on rights in the German Basic Law, a monograph that has exerted a huge 
influence upon the global model of rights more generally.40 Yet, in spite of his defence of Radbruch, 
Alexy seems to forget a large part of Radbruch’s message when he turns to the subject of 
constitutional rights. For Alexy argues that, in applying proportionality doctrine, no weight is to be 
attached to the fact that the allegedly offending enactment has indeed been published as a law by the 
proper law-making authority. To give the mere positivity of the law any weight in this context would, 
in Alexy’s view, negate the priority of the constitution over ordinary parliamentary legislation.41  
Alexy’s view is clearly question-begging, since it simply assumes that the proportionality doctrine, 
unmodified by any distinct concern for the need for certainty in law, is an appropriate test of 
constitutionality. Yet that is the very question in issue. Sound or not, Alexy’s argument is influential 
and shows us the way the wind has been blowing, for a very long time.  
Judges have been faced with the task of interpreting and applying constitutional documents which 
appear to create constitutional rights with one hand and then abrogate them with the other. This 
situation is perhaps regrettable. The documents might have been construed differently, as requiring 
genuine pursuit of legitimate state objectives rather than as inviting a judicial assessment of 
competing values.42 Possibly, the relevant documents should have been drafted along different lines 
so as to facilitate the courts in giving constitutional rights hard edges and peremptory force. More 
probably, the idea of judicially enforced constitutional rights, framed by reference to fundamental 
protected interests, is attractive in the abstract but proves to be flawed when we consider the 
problems surrounding its implementation. The current situation, however, is unlikely to be reversed. 
So what should the judges now do? How should the judges interpret the various constitutional 
documents that gave rise to the global model of constitutional rights? My principal aim in this essay is 
to offer an analysis of the current situation and its illusions, not to prescribe solutions. But I might 
justly be criticised if I were to say nothing whatever about possible strategies for ameliorating that 
situation. The remarks which follow are therefore sketchy and speculative in intent. 
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40 Alexy, op. cit. n.9 above. 
41 Alexy, `Comments and Responses’ in M.Klatt (ed.), Institutionalized Reason: The Jurisprudence of Robert 
Alexy, (Oxford University Press 2012) p.331.  
42 Such an interpretation is in many ways the most natural one to adopt. While undoubtedly creating problems 
of its own, it does at least focus judicial attention upon the issue of outright evil, and acknowledges the moral 
priority of mutual civility over this or that contestable idea of perfect justice. 
One thing that judges might try would be to arrest the radiating effect of rights and give each right 
(and, consequently, the proportionality test) a narrowly limited domain. This would avoid the 
destabilising effects that constitutional rights can at present have upon practically the entire body of 
laws. Since we disagree about justice, a great many laws can (not wholly unreasonably) be challenged 
as unjust; and such challenges can always be framed as arguments about proportionality, provided 
that some of the interests encroached upon can be brought within the scope of a constitutional right. 
Attempts to restrict the scope of rights will, of course, face serious problems. But the problems may 
not be insuperable, and some attempt in this direction should be made.  
Alternatively, or additionally, judges might try to develop, through their decisions on proportionality, 
a clear body of rules (reflecting Alexy’s `Law of Competing Principles’) and not simply very general 
balancing guidelines. Judges might in this way acknowledge their duty of fidelity to the idea of law, 
understood as a system of rules and rights (both constitutional rights and ordinary legal rights) with 
peremptory force. They would contribute to the maintenance of a legal tradition within which 
determinate rules and doctrines are central: what Finnis has described as `the vast legal effort to 
render the law … relatively impervious to discretionary assessments of competing values.’43 The 
development of such rules, however, will inevitably be the slow growth of time if it occurs at all; and, 
while time passes, the judges may become increasingly accustomed to, and comfortable with, their 
new and more free-wheeling role. As explained above, judges could easily avoid creating such rules 
and might well be expected to cling tenaciously to the power that they enjoy in the absence of such 
rules.   
Finally, and particularly if (as is quite likely) the above strategies prove to be too difficult to implement, 
judges might replace the proportionality test with what might loosely be thought of as a test of gross 
disproportionality or (perhaps better) gross injustice.44 In other words the question should not be `is 
this law unjust?’ but `is this law so grossly unjust that no reasonable person could consider it to be 
just?’. This test should be construed as resembling the formula proposed by Gustav Radbruch, as his 
own proposal for avoiding a repetition of the horrors of the Third Reich. And, in the case of the German 
Basic Law and the European Convention on Human Rights, it would come closer than the present 
doctrine to capturing the original aims of the drafters, those aims being the prevention of a recurrence 
of abhorrent evil, and not the conferment on judges of a perfectly general power to review the justice 
of the laws. Radbruch’s formula contemplated situations in extremis. It is unavoidably vague, but an 
objection grounded upon vagueness can scarcely lie in the mouths of those who advocate the doctrine 
of proportionality, which is no less vague and (in not being limited to extreme situations) of far wider 
scope and with far wider implications.  
The virtues of a test of gross injustice, by comparison with the present law, are twofold. In the first 
place, it confines the impact of vague balancing tests to the extreme margin, leaving a broad swathe 
of ordinary political contexts where the rights conferred by statute or common law can enjoy genuine 
peremptory force without the constant risk of being overturned in a constitutional challenge. There 
can always be extreme situations where we are forced to choose between core values even though 
some of those core values may be of a kind that cannot without loss be integrated in a balancing or 
optimising framework. But, if the distinctive character of such values is to be preserved, one must try 
to ensure that the approach that is forced upon us in extremis does not become a feature of the value’s 
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diurnal role. Rights which possess peremptory force, but which may have to be set aside in situations 
of extremity, are not thereby reduced to optimisation requirements, or interests to be weighed in a 
general calculus of considerations. 
Secondly, and very importantly, a doctrine along the lines of Radbruch’s formula could represent a 
public articulation and endorsement of the value of mutual civility, rather than (as at present, under 
an unmodified proportionality test) a violation of mutual civility in the name of a supposedly perfect 
justice.  
Some view me as pushing at an open door. I have been told by colleagues that a concern for truly 
gross injustice is what we have at present. Those who adopt this interpretation of the doctrine see the 
courts as already exercising the necessary severe self-restraint in applying the test of proportionality. 
I must confess that I do not share their understanding of current events or current doctrine. It is true 
that, in the law of the European Convention on Human Rights there has been talk of a certain `margin 
of appreciation’. But this is normally linked to claims concerning the need for local communities to 
judge their own needs and circumstances if perfect justice is to be achieved. I see no 
acknowledgement here of the demands of mutual civility, or of the fact that mutual civility demands 
a willingness to comply with (and to enforce) laws that some will, not unreasonably, consider to be 
unjust.  
Others appear to be rightly concerned about the capacity of proportionality doctrine greatly to enlarge 
the power of the judges.45 Thus Kai Moller proposes a test of `reasonableness’ as opposed to 
`correctness’.46 But proposals of this sort, by working within the general framework of proportionality 
doctrine, appear to rest upon an endorsement of the idea that rights are optimisation requirements 
rather than peremptory constraints. They may seek to check the dangerous growth of judicial power, 
but they nevertheless do so within an intellectual framework that is in danger of obliterating the 
distinctive character of rights. The approach that I am advocating, by contrast, wholly rejects the idea 
that rights are optimisation requirements, while acknowledging that the binding force of rights is 
dependent upon a degree of mutual civility being respected and maintained. Outside of extreme 
situations of truly gross injustice, ordinary legal rights can then continue to enjoy peremptory force. 
Constitutional rights should be understood as providing a framework of positive law within which the 
issue of gross injustice can be addressed. 
There are those who will say that evil must be nipped in the bud, and that this requires the courts to 
intervene as soon as the law appears to depart from justice: one cannot afford to wait for the evil to 
reach a truly gross level. But those who argue this way allow the fear of evil to become an evil in itself. 
They abandon the attainable virtue of mutual civility in pursuit of an ideal that fails to acknowledge 
the broad scope of reasonable disagreement. We do not inhabit the Garden of Eden, but a fallen world 
where we disagree. Nor do we seek eventually to find our way back to Eden. Rather, we willingly 
accept the burden of our humanity, and seek to make our habitation in full acknowledgment of our 
limitations. We aim to establish and strengthen the bonds of friendship within a world where 
                                                          
45 Meanwhile, many celebrate and seek to extend that power by invoking the image of a `dialogue’ between 
the courts and the legislature. The image gains plausibility from the fact that adjudicative reasoning should 
properly be guided by an assumption that the established rules serve some coherent conception of justice. 
This is a feature of adjudicative reason that Dworkin has chosen to describe in terms of `collaboration’ and 
`partnership’: see Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, (Harvard 2011) p.136. But (as was pointed out 
above) it is the object of constitutional rights to provide a point of critical leverage upon established rules, not 
to explicate the conception of justice implicit within such rules. In this context, courts function as the critical 
censors of the legislature, not as their dialogic partners in a common project. 
46 Kai Moller, op.cit. n.25 above, Chap. 5.  
individual reason is an imperfect guide.  These are the basic facts of the human condition which 
require from us the virtue of mutual civility, and which make that value of greater relevance than 
perfect justice.  
We should be careful not to place at the heart of our law and politics an institutional violation of 
mutual civility, whereby those with power (in this case, the judges) are willing to employ that power 
to overturn the reasonable, even if somewhat misguided, judgements of their fellow citizens. For, if 
we do that, how can civil compliance be expected of our citizens? What value can the judges invoke, 
as a basis for the binding force of their own (frequently contestable) decisions, when those decisions 
appear to deny the possibility of reasonable disagreement concerning justice?  
If laws are disobeyed (whether by citizens or judges) on the grounds of their injustice (as opposed to 
gross injustice of a kind that violates mutual civility) this must be as a well-judged act of civil 
disobedience designed to draw attention to the law and combined with a willingness to accept the 
resulting punishment, or other consequences (resignation being the appropriate course of action for 
judges), as entirely legitimate. Civil disobedience can in this way be fully compatible with, and even 
serve to reinforce, the value of mutual civility. 
The institutions which embody and express mutual civility are a product of artifice, informed by time 
and experience. Consequently, there is no blueprint for liberal democracy, and certainly not one that 
can be arrived at by pure theoretical reflection. For this reason I do not offer a set of detailed 
prescriptions, but merely some suggestions concerning the way in which our present unhappy 
situation might be ameliorated. Nevertheless there are certain aspirations which should shape the 
character of a liberal democracy. If I had to identify some of those aspirations I would say that they 
include (i) the rule of law, understood in a relatively austere way as governance by rigorously enforced 
rules compliant with Lon Fuller’s eight requirements; (ii) secure rights with peremptory force (itself a 
consequence of the rule of law understood in that austere sense); and (iii) the practices of mutual 
civility, understood as requiring, amongst other things, respect for and compliance with established 
laws which we may consider to be of imperfect justice. All of these aspirations, it seems to me, are 
endangered by the currently influential model of constitutional rights.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
